We analyze arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. These channels are subject to two attacks at the same time: one passive (eavesdropping), and one active (jamming). We progress on previous works [5] and [6] by introducing a reduced class of allowed codes that fulfills a more stringent secrecy requirement than earlier definitions. In addition, we prove that non-symmetrizability of the legal link is sufficient for equality of the deterministic and the common randomness assisted secrecy capacities. At last, we focus on analytic properties of both secrecy capacities: We completely characterize their discontinuity points, and their super-activation properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
This work is a progress of our previous papers [5] and [6] , where we considered both channel robustness against jamming and security against eavesdropping. In this paper we consider classical-quantum channels, i.e. the inputs are classical data and the outputs are quantum systems. The capacity of classical-quantum channels has been determined in [12] and [13] . In the model of an arbitrarily varying channel we consider channel uncertainty, i.e. transmission over a channel which is not stationary, but can change with every use of the channel. We interpret it as a channel with a jammer. The arbitrarily varying channel was first introduced in [4] . A lower bound for the capacity of an arbitrarily varying classicalquantum channel has been given in [2] . An alternative proof and a proof of the strong converse are given in [3] . In [1] the Ahlswede Dichotomy for the arbitrarily varying classicalquantum channels is established, and a sufficient and necessary condition for the zero deterministic capacity is given. In [8] a simplification of this condition is given. In the model of a wiretap channel we consider communication under security constraints. This was first introduced in [16] . We interpret * Project "Abhörsichere Kommunikation, Attacken und Systemdesign, Q.com-Teilprojekte Informationstheorie des Quanten the wiretap channel as a channel with an eavesdropper. The secrecy capacity of classical-quantum wiretap channel has been determined in [11] and [9] .
In work [6] we determined the secrecy capacities under common randomness assisted coding of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. We showed that randomness is a very helpful resource for protecting the secure message transmission against jamming attacks. In [5] we established the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, i.e. either the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying channel is zero or equal to its randomness assisted capacity. Our proof is similar to the idea in [2] : When the legal channel is not symmetrizable (cf. Def. II.1) the legal channel users can use a small amount of qubits to create the common randomness. We build a twopart code word, the first part is used to create the common randomness for the sender and the legal receiver, the second is used to transmit the message to the legal receiver. In [5] and [6] we also examined when the secrecy capacity was a continuous function of the system parameters. Furthermore, we proved the phenomenon "super-activation" for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, i.e. two channels, both with zero deterministic secrecy capacity, if used together allowed perfect secure transmission.
As aforementioned the lower bound in [5] and [6] is showed by building a two-part deterministic code. However that code concept still leaves something to be desired because we had to reduce the generality of the code concept when we explicitly allowed a small part of the code word to be non-secure. The code word we built was a composition of a public code word to synchronize the second part and a common randomness assisted code word to transmit the message. We only require security for the last part. As we show in Corollary IV.1, when the jammer has access to the first part, it will be rendered completely useless. Thus the code concept only works when the jammer is limited in his action, e.g. we have to assume that eavesdropper cannot send messages towards the jammer. Never the less this code concept with weak criterion can be useful when small amount of public messages is desired, e.g. when the receive uses it to estimate the channels. In this work we consider the general code concept when we construct a code in such a way that every part of it is secure. We show that when the legal channel is not symmetrizabel the sender can send a small amount of secure transmissions which push the secure capacity to the maximally attainable value. Thus the entire security is granted. We call it the strong code concept. This completes our analysis of Arbitrarily varying classicalquantum wiretap channel. In [5] we analyzed the secrecy capacities with randomness assistance and showed that shared randomness was helpful as long as the jammer know noting about it. In this work we analyze the case when the shared randomness is not secure against the jammer. In [6] we show that the secrecy capacity is in general not a continuous function of the system parameters. In [5] we prove super-activation for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. In this work we establish complete characterizations for continuity and positivity of the capacity function of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, and a complete characterization for super-activation.
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND COMMUNICATION SCENARIOS
Let A be a finite set and H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. We denote the sets of probability distributions on A by P (A), and the space of density operators on H by S(H). For finite sets A and B we define a (discrete) classical channel V: P (A) → P (B), P (A) p → V(p) ∈ P (B) to be a system characterized by a probability transition matrix V(·|·). Let H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. A classical-quantum channel is a linear map W : P (A) → S(H), P (A) p → W (p) ∈ S(H). For a discrete random variable X on a finite set A and a discrete random variable Y on a finite set B we denote d the mutual information between X and Y by I(X; Y ). Let Φ := {ρ x : x ∈ A} be a set of quantum states on S(H) labeled by elements of A. For a probability distribution P on A, we denote the Holevo χ quantity by χ(P ; Φ). For a probability distribution P on a finite set A and a positive constant δ, we denote the set of typical sequences by T n P,δ . Let n ∈ N, α > 0, and G be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. For a ρ ∈ S(G) the orthogonal subspace projector onto the α-typical subspace of ρ is denoted by Π ρ,α . Let A be a finite set and V: A → S(G) be a classical-quantum channel. The orthogonal subspace projector onto the α-conditional typical subspace of V for a typical sequence a n is denoted by Π V,α (a n ).
Definition II.1. Let A and B be finite sets, and H be a finitedimensional complex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, . . . , T } be a finite set. For every t ∈ θ let W t be a classical channel P (A) → P (B), and W t be a classical-quantum channel P (A) → S(H). We call the set of the classical channels {W t : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying channeland the set of the classical-quantum channels {W t : t ∈ θ} an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channelwhen the channel state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner.
We say {W t : t ∈ θ} and {W t : t ∈ θ} are symmetrizable if there exists a parametrized set of distributions {τ (· | a) : a ∈ A} on θ such that for all a, a ∈ A,
Definition II.2. Let A and B be finite sets, and H be a finitedimensional complex Hilbert spaces. Let θ := {1, 2, · · · } be an index set. For every t ∈ θ let W t be a classical channel P (A) → P (B) and V t be a classical-quantum channel P (A) → S(H). We call the set of the classical/classicalquantum channel pairs {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} an classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel, when the state t varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner, while the legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first channel, i.e., W t in the pair (W t , V t ), and the wiretapper observes the output of the second channel, i.e., V t in the pair
consists of a stochastic encoder E : {1, · · · , J n } → P (A n ), j → E(·|j), specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities E(·|·), and a collection of positive-semidefinite operators {D j : j ∈ {1, · · · , J n }} on H ⊗n , which is a partition of the identity, i.e. Jn j=1 D j = id H ⊗n . Definition II.5. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} if for every > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exist an (n, J n ) code
where R uni is the uniform distribution on {1, · · · J n }. We say we consider the strong code concept when the the entire code is secure against eavesdropping. Here P e (C, t n ) (the average probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C, when the channel state is t n ), is defined as
J n } is the set of the resulting quantum state at the output of the wiretap channel. The supremum of all secrecy rates under strong code concept is called the secrecy
Definition II.6. We denote the set of (n, J n ) deterministic codes by Λ. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} under randomness assisted coding if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and > 0, if n is sufficiently large, there is an s a distribution G on (Λ, σ) such that log Jn n > R − δ, and
Here σ is a sigma-algebra so chosen such that the functions γ → P e (C γ , t n ) and γ → χ (R uni ; Z C γ ,t n ) are both Gmeasurable with respect to σ for every t n ∈ θ n A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel
Here σ is a sigma-algebra so chosen such that the functions γ → max t n ∈θ n P e (C γ , t n ) and γ → max t n ∈θ n χ (R uni ; Z C γ ,t n ) are both G-measurable with respect to σ. The supremum on achievable secrecy rate for the {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} under randomness assisted coding is called the randomness assisted secrecy capacity of {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} denoted by C s ({(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ}, r). The supremum on achievable secrecy rate for the {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} under non-secure randomness assisted coding is called the non-secure randomness assisted secrecy capacity of
Definition II.7. An (n, J n ) code C for the classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} consists of a stochastic encoder E : {1, · · · , J n } → P (A n ), j → E(·|j), specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities E(·|·), and a collection of mutually disjoint sets {D j ⊂ B n : j ∈ {1, . . . , J n }} (decoding sets).
Definition II.8. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} if for every > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exist an (n, J n ) code C = E, {D j : j = 1, · · · J n } such that log Jn n > R − δ, and
III. STRONG CODE CONCEPT
In view of the importance of shared randomness for robustness, the shared randomness is not allowed to be known by the jammer (cf. Corollary IV.1). Thus when we allow two-way communication between the jammer and the eavesdropper, the code concept of [5] will fail. For classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channels the authors of [14] used a very simple method to overcome this problem: Applying a technique introduced in [10] they made the first part secure and used it to send the message instead just the common randomness. The code they constructed is thus a one-part deterministic secure code. However, it is technically difficult to extend the random classical code technique introduced in [10] to classical-quantum channels, thus we have to find another way. We have to use some tricks and gimmicks to make the first part, the deterministic code, secure, but due to technical difficulties it cannot be used to send the total amount of secure message as a one-part code. Our idea is falling back on two-part code and using the first part to transmit a small amount of secret information to guarantee robust communication. For the complete proof we suggest our readers to view our full version [7] .
For our proof at first we determine a capacity formula for a mixed channel model, i.e. the secrecy capacity of classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel.
HereB t are the resulting classical random variables at the output of the legitimate receiver's channels and Z t n are the resulting quantum states at the output of wiretap channels. The maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy the Markov chain relationships: U → A →B n q Z t n for everyB q ∈ Conv((B t ) t∈θ ) and t n ∈ θ n . A is here a random variable taking values on A and U is a random variable taking values on some finite set U with probability distribution p U .
Sketch of the Proof:
We fix a p ∈ P (A) and use a random encoding technique. Jn},l∈{1,. ..,Ln} be a family of random variables taking value according to p . We define V(t, p) := V t (p) and Q t n (x n ) := Π V(·,p),α (t n )Π V,α (t n , x n ) ·V t n (x n ) ·Π V,α (t n , x n )Π V(·,p),α (t n ) for a positive α. By the Gentle Operator Lemma (cf. [15] ) for any t and x n , it holds that Q t n (x n ) − V t n (x n ) 1 ≤ √ 2 −nβ(α) , where β(α) is a positive constant depending on α. We set Θ t n := x n ∈T p,δ p t n (x n )Q t n (x n ). Let L n = 2 max t n χ(p;Z t n )+2nζ . By our Alternative Covering Lemma in [6] it holds
for a suitable positive constant υ. We assume that {Ẁ t : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable. By the results of [10] for every realization {x j,l : j, l} of {X j,l : j, l} there exists a set of mutually disjoint sets {D x j,l : j ∈ {1, · · · , J n }, l ∈ {1, · · · , L n } on B n such that for all positive t n , l, and j, we have
for some positive β and γ. By the Fannes Inequality we can show that when for a realization {x j,l : j, l} of {X j,l : j, l} Ln l=1 1
for all t n and j holds, then for any positive λ if n is sufficiently large, we have χ R uni ;Ž t n ≤ λ. Now we are going to prove our main result: the secrecy capacity formula for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels using strong code concept. Since the technique introduced in [10] for classical channels cannot be easily transferred into quantum channels, our idea is to construct a classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel and apply Theorem III.1. In [2] a technique has been introduced to construct a classical arbitrarily varying channel by means of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel. However this technique does not work for classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel since it cannot provide security. We have to find a more sophisticated way.
Theorem III.2. If the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {W t : t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable, then
(3) Here B t are the resulting quantum states at the output of the legitimate receiver's channels.
We denote m := log n and the dimension of H by d. We assume that inf Bq∈Conv((Bt) t∈θ ) χ(p U ; B ⊗n q ) − max t n ∈θ n χ(p U ; Z t n ) > 0. At first we use Theorem 1 in [6] to show that we can construct a mixed channel model called compoundarbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel with positive deterministic secrecy capacity. Next combining the idea of [2] and the concept of superposition code we define a classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel
Here {Ẁ t m : t m ∈ θ m } is a classical arbitrarily varying channel : P (U m ) → P ({1, · · · , d m2 + 3}) that is not symmetrizable. We use the positive deterministic secrecy capacity of the compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel to show that for sufficiently large m, all q ∈ P (θ m ), and j ∈ {1, 2} there is a positive λ such thatẀ
and for all q ∈ P (θ m ) and j = i ∈ {1, 2} we havè
Furthermore by the the positive deterministic secrecy capacity of the compound-arbitrarily varying wiretap classical-quantum channel if m is sufficiently large for any n ∈ N, and positive ζ we have 1 n max
whereŽ t mn is the resulting quantum state at the output ofV t mn . This implies the existence of a p on P (U) such that min q∈P (θ m ) I(p,B n q ) − max t mn ∈θ mn χ(p,Ž t mn ) is positive for any n ∈ N. By Theorem III.1 there exists a ((log n) 2 , n 3 ) secure deterministic code for {(Ẁ t m ,V t m ) : t m ∈ θ m } that conveys information to the legal receiver and keeps the wiretapper's knowledge arbitrarily small. Next we show that a ((log n) 2 , n 3 ) secure deterministic code for
Let J n = 2 maxp U (inf Bq χ(p U ;B ⊗n q )−max t n χ(p U ;Z t n ))−nδ . Now we can construct a ((log n) 3 + n, n 3 J n ) code with two-part code words for {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ}. The first parts of the code words arise from a ((log n) 2 
They are used to send the randomization index, i.e. the outputs of a uniformly distributed random variable on {1, · · · , n 3 }, to the legal receiver such that the eavesdropper knows nothing about the common randomness. The second parts are common randomness assisted secure code words transmitting the actual secret message. Unlike in [5] , here the first part is secure, too. Finally, by a technique introduced in [6] we can show that the eavesdropper not only gather no knowledge from the second part about the secret message, but neither any knowledge about the common randomness from it, as well. This means that ether part of the code word leaks neither any information about the common randomness nor any information about the secret message to the eavesdropper.
IV. SOME APPLICATIONS
In [5] we showed that an arbitrarily varying classicalquantum channel with zero deterministic secrecy capacity allowed secure transmission if the sender and the legal receiver had the possibility to use shared randomness as long as the shared randomness was kept secret against the jammer. Corollary IV.1 shows that when the jammer is able to have access to the outcomes of the shared random experiment, we can only achieve the rate as when we do not use any shared randomness at all. This means the shared randomness will be completely useless when it is known by the jammer.
Corollary IV.1. Let {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. We have
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is symmetrizable, Corollary IV.1 is a consequence of our result in [5] where we showed that for any (n, J n ) code C there is are t n ∈ θ n and a positive c such that P e (C, t n ) > c.
In [5] it has been shown that the deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is in general not continuous. Now we deliver the sufficient and necessary conditions for the continuity of the capacity function of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. 
Corollary IV.2. For an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
, the deterministic secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel is discontinuous at {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} if and only if the following hold: 1) the secrecy capacity of {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} under common randomness assisted quantum coding is positive; 2) F ({W t : t}) = 0 but for every positive δ there is a {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} ∈ C δ such that F ({W t : t}) > 0.
Corollary IV.3. Let {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. When the secrecy capacity of {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} is positive then there is a δ such that for all {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} ∈ C δ we have C s ({(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ}) > 0.
In [5] super-activation has been shown for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, i.e., two arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels, which are themselves "useless" in the sense that they have both zero secrecy capacity, acquire positive secrecy capacity when they are used together. Now we are deliver a complete characterization of super-activation for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
Corollary IV.4. Let {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} and {(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ} be two arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
1) If C s ({(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ}) = C s ({(W t , V t ) : t ∈ θ}) = 0 then C s ({W t ⊗ W t , V t ⊗ V t : t, t ∈ θ}) is positive is true if and only if {W t ⊗ W t : t, t ∈ θ} is not symmetrizable and C s ({W t ⊗ W t , V t ⊗ V t : t, t ∈ θ}, cr) is positive.
2) If the secrecy capacity under common randomness Sketch of the Proofs: Corollaries IV.2, IV.3, and IV.4 can be proved when we apply the techniques for classical channels introduced in [14] to our results in [5] and [6] for classicalquantum channels.
